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A Sea Change or Much Ado About Nothine?
The Future of New Mexico Jurisprudence Concerning Tort Claims Arising from
On-the-job Injuries of Employees in the Wake of Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Cirino
and the Substantial Certainty Test
"The greater the impact this opinion has on the workers' compensation system, the more
profound will have been its need. "
- Justice Franchini. Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc.
"[l)t is a tale ... full ofsound andfury, signifying nothing."
William Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 5.

I.

INTRODUCTION
The New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino.

1
Inc. oveITUled the "actual intent test" and created an exception to the exclusivity

provisions of the Workers Compensation Act which holds employers legally responsible
for on-the-job injuries. 2 This exception allowed for employees, when seriously injured or
killed on the job, to pursue remedies outside the constraints of the Act and sue in tort.
Delgado replaced the "actual intent" test, which provided for legal relief in tort only

when an employer could be shown to have actually intended to hann the employee who
was injured or killed, with a three-pronged test based on whether the employer's conduct
was willful, and whether the act in question was substantially certain to cause serious
injury or death. 3

1

2001-NMSC-034, 131 N.M. 272, 34 P.3d 1148.
N.M. ·stat. Ann. §§ 52-1-1 to -70 (199 I Rep!. Pamp. & Supp. 200 I); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 52-5-1 (I 991
Rep!. Pamp. & Supp. 2001).
3
Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034 � 26, 131 N.M. at 280, 34 P.3d at 1156.
2
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The new standard created by the Delgado decision, holding employers
responsible for conduct that is something less than intentional but more than negligence,4
purported to set the stage for a deluge of tort claims from injured employees who
previously would have been precluded as a matter of law from recovering damages
outside of the Act.5 Justice Franchini, in response to defense (and, by proxy, insurance
company) concerns that his ruling would ''wreak havoc" with the workers• compensation
system, threw down the legal gauntlet by closing his opinion with the memorable caveat
reproduced in the quotation supra. 6
However, examination of Delgado and its New Mexico progeny, and comparison
with case law in other jurisdictions with rules similar to those articulated by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, indicate that while Delgado changed the law, its application is so
narrow as to have minimal impact. Subsequent interpretations of the Delgado exception
in New Mexico and other jurisdictions employing a similar standard have defined narrow
boundaries and severely limited the scope of its coverage. As a result, Franchini 's
admonition, however dramatic in putting employers on notice that they will be held to
stricter standards for protecting their employees, effectively seems to "signify nothing"
beyond the unique facts presented by Delgado. The following discussion illustrates how
Delgado is likely to come into play only in those rare instances where an employer's
conduct is particularly egregious and the underlying facts are specifically analogous to
those which led to the death of Reynaldo Delgado.
• See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts§ 8 (4th ed. 1971) ("Intent is broader than a desire to bring
about physical results. It must extend not only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those
which the actor believes arc substantially certain to follow[ ... ]").
5 Sec Exhibit A attached hereto for a fact�spccific example of a suil brought for wrongful death in New
Mex.ico under Delgado wh.ich survived defense summary judgment motions but was settled before trial.
6
Delgado, 2001-NMSC-034, ,J 31, 131 N.M. 272, 281, 34 P.3d 1148, 1157.
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IT .

DEL GADO REVISITED
Reynaldo Delgado died from extensive bums suffered during an exp losion at a

Deming, New Mexi co copper smelting plant. The explosion occurred shortly after
Del gado 's supervisors, in response to an emergency condition known as a "runaway,"
ordered him to dri ve a special ized vehicle cal led a kress-haul into a tunnel and attempt to
remove a 1 5- foot high cauldron, called a "lad le," that was rapidly filling with molten
slag. The l adle could safely have been removed had Del gado 's supervisors shut down the
furnace, but the decision was made, for economic reasons, to keep the furnace burning
and send Delgado in alone to attempt to remove the l adle, despite the fact that Delgado
had never operated a kress-haul under runaway conditions . Entering the tunnel and seeing
that the l adle already was overflowing, Delgado rad ioed one of his supervisors and
informed him that he was neither qual i fi ed nor able to remove the ladle. His supervisor
twice insisted, over Delgado ' s protestati ons, that he proceed with the removal . Shortly
thereafter, the tunnel fil led with smoke and Del gado emerged, engul fed in flames. "I told
them I coul dn ' t do i t,'' Delgado said before co llapsing on the ground. "They made me do
it anyway. Charlie sent me in. " Reynaldo Del gado died three weeks l ater in an Arizona
hospital. 7
Delgado 's widow bro ught a number o f tort claims i n New Mex i co district court
against Delgado ' s supervisors and his emp loyer, Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc., including
wrongful death. The district court dismissed the action on defense 's Ru le 1 - 0 1 2(B)6
motion for failure to state a claim, on the grounds that the Workers Compensation Act
7

Delgado, 200 1 -NMSC-034 ,i 3 -5, 1 3 1 N.M. at 275
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provided the excl usive remedy for Delgado ' s death. The New Mex i co Court of Appeals
upheld the ruling. The New Mex ico Supreme Court reversed , holding conduct that js
willful and reasonably certain to cause serious inj ury or death is legally equivalent, for
the purposes of superced ing the exclusivity prov isions o f the Workers Compensation Act,
to i ntentional inj ury of an emplo yee. When an emp loyer intentionally inflicts or willfully
causes a worker to su ffer an i nj ury that would otherwise be exclusively compensab le
under the Act, that employer may not enjoy the benefits of exclusivity, and the i nj ured
worker may sue in tort . 8 The new rule was articulated as follows:
For pUIJ)oses of the Act, w i l l fulness occurs when : ( l) the worker or
emp loyer engages i n an i ntentional act or omission, without j ust cause or
excuse, that is reasonably expected to resul t in the injury suffered by the
worker; (2) the worker or employer expects the injury to occur, or has
utterl y disregarded the consequences o f the intentional act or omission;
and (3) the intent ional act or omission prox imately causes the inj ury. 9
Thus was born the three-pronged Delgado test, though it was n ever actually
applied to its own facts by a j ury. The case, rem anded to district court, was sett led before
trial .

8

9

Id. at
/d.

4
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III.

POST-DELGADO NEW MEX ICO JURISPRUDENCE
Nearly three years after Delgado, neither the New Mexico Supreme Court nor the

court of app eals has revisi ted the issue. Federal courts have under color of New Mexico
law twice applied the Delgado test in diversity cases: The United States D istrict Court,
D i strict of New Mexico, granted summary j udgment in favor of defendants in Cordova v.
Peavey Co. ,

10

an d th e 1 0th Circui t upheld a Rule 1 2(b)(6) motion fo r defendants i n Wells

v. U. S. Foodservice, Inc., holdi ng that plainti ff failed to allege facts bringing the c laim
within the ambit of the Delgado rule.

11

In Cordova , the plaintiff, a temporary custodial employee, lost his arm when he
reached into a grain auger to remove a piece of twine from one o f the au ger 's teeth at the
same time that another employee, who cou ld not see the plainti ff because o f an extension
previously installed on the auger by defendants , engaged the auger. There was no safety
guard on the au ger, defendants did not train either emp loyee in the operation of the auger,
and neither employee was supervised at the time of the accident. Further, the task being
performed, per instruction from his supervisor, by the plainti ff when he was inj ured was
prohib ited by the terms of his employment agreement. 1 2 Plaint i ff made a Delgado clai m,
asserti ng that the lack of sa fety precautions and training, coupled w i th the contravention
of the terms of pl ai ntiffs employment agreement , amounted to w i l l fu l conduct on the
part of defendants, resulting in the i nj ury. 1 3 In ruling for defendants, t he district court
appl i ed the three-pronged Delgado test. The court held that it was not foreseeab le that the
second employee would start the auger at the same time plaint i ff reached into it (first
2 7 3 F.S u pp .2d 1 2 1 3 ( D-N . M . 2003 ) . Th e c a s e i s cUITentl y on a pp e a l t o th e 1 0th Circuit.
1 1 2004 WL
84 8606 ( 1 0th Cir.(N . M . )( S l i p Co py, A pri l 2 1 , 2 004 ) .
11
Cordo va, 273 F. Su pp . 2 d at 1 2 1 5- 1 6 .
10

13

Id. at 1 2 1 7.
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prong), and that there was no evidence that defendants expected plainti ff to be injured or
that they utterl y disregarded the consequences of their decision to assign p l aintiff a task
outside the ambit of hi s emp loyment agreement (second prong). Having ruled for
defendants on the first and second prongs, the court declined to address the third prong
(proximate cause). The court also dist inguished the facts from those o f Delgado, noting
"one is easily repulsed by the insensitivity of Phelps Dodge Supervisors to what had to be
4

most certainly a disastrous outcome for the emp loyee." 1 The Cordova court's words
emphasize its reluctance to extend Delgado beyond conduct that is clearly willfully
cu lpable, if not actually intentional, and apply it to circumstances more closely
resembling gross negligence. 1 5
The 1 0th Circuit, in decidi ng Wells, was simi larly reluctant to expand the holding
in Delgado. Darrell Well s was a truck driver who was delivering products to defendants'
customers when he was i nj ured by a case of Tabasco sauce that tumbled out of the trailer
and fell on him when he was unloading boxes from the trailer. 1 6 Wells claimed under

Delgado that defendants' failure to provide a load lock on the trai ler to prevent the cargo
from shi fting was an intentional omission under 49 C.F.R. § 393 . 1 00 o f the Federal
Motor Canier Safety Adm inistration, Department of Transportat ion Regulations. The
court ruled that Wells ' claim fai l ed al l three prongs of the Delgado test and refused to
eq uate an intentional omission with intentional conduct that proximately causes an injury.

1

• Id. at 1 2 1 9-20.
u Plaintiffs brief submined to the I 0th Circuit in support of its pend ing appeal asserts that the
circumstances of the case as described herein coostinne factual issues re lating 10 Peavey' s breach of its
employment contract with Cordova that preclude swnmary j udgment, and that Peavey' s instructions to
Cordova to work on machinery in direct contradiction o f bis employment contract constitutes willful and
intentional conduct.
16

Wells. 2004 WL 848606 (page references not available).
6
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The court even quoted counsel for the defense, which st ated in oral argument, "This case
is not so Delgado. "

17

Cordova an d Wells are an indication o f New Mexico courts' reluctance to expand

the bounds of Delgado beyond the scope of its particular facts, but the body of case law is
still too sparse i n and of itself to paint a complete picture of what will defi ne Delgado ·s
boundaries. For that, we t um to another j urisdiction, North Carol ina, which has addressed
the issues raised by Delgado i n both greater number and detai l .

IV .

NORTH CAROLINA JURIS PRUDENCE AS A S IGNPOST FOR DELGADO
Other jurisdictions that have considered how egregious employer conduct must be

to override exclusivity provi si ons of workers compensation statutes have reached
d i fferent results. The actual intent test is still in place in some states, 1 8 but that is the
exception rather than the ru le. A number of states addressing the issue have, like New
Mexico, rej ected the actual i ntent test and adopted some form of requirement of willful
intentional conduct which the employer knows i s substantially certain to cause injury or
death to supercede exclusivity provisions of workers compensation statutes. 1 9 North
Carolina, in particular, adopted a view toward employer misconduct as it relates to
superceding exclusivity t hat is substantially similar to the test adopted in Delgado. As
such, a closer examination o f the body of relevant case law in North Carolina is
instructive.
, 1 Id.
18
See e.g .. Griffin v. George 's, Inc. . 267 Ark . 9 1 , 589 S.W.2d 24 ( 1 979) .
19 Howard v. Columbus Products Co . . 82 Ohio App.3d 1 29, 6 1 l N . E . 2d 480 ( 1 992); Fe/den v. Asliland
Chemical Co .. Inc. 9 1 Oh.io App.3d 48, 63 1 N .E.2d 689 ( 1 993 ) · Beauclwmp v. Dow Chemical Co .. 4 27
M ich. I , 398 N.W.2d 882 ( 1 986); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Products. 334 N. W.2d 8 74 ( S . D . 1 983);
Suarez v. Dickmo,u Plastics Corp. , 229 Conn . 99, 639 A.2d 507 ( 1 994).

7
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In Woodson v. Ro wland, the seminal case in the state for employer misconduct
resulting in employee injury sup erceding workers compensation exclusivity provisions,
the Supreme Court of North C arolina held when an emp loyer intentional ly engages in
misconduct knowing it is substantially certain to cause serious inj ury or death, the
employee, or the personal representative, may seek a remedy in tort against the
employer. 20 The thi rd Delgado prong, proximate cause, was not spelled out in the
Woodson decision, but was later incorporated into the Woodson test.

21

The Woodson

court used the term "constructive intent" to describe the kind of employer conduct which
takes a plaint i ff's claim ou_t side of workers compensation. This interpretat ion is
analogous to the reasoning behind Delgado, and the substantial certainty rule adopted in
Woodson and the body of case J aw arising there from provides a signpost for how New

Mexico l aw under Delgado might yet develop.
In Woodson, the facts were, as was the case in Delgado, indicative o f particu l arly
egregious behavior on the part of the defendant emp loyer constituting "constructive
i ntent . " The decedent was ki lled when a ditch he was digging at the behest of his
employer collapsed and buried him. Earlier that day, the defendant employer made the
decision not to use a safety devi ce called a trench box in the trench or to otherwise
protect or reinforce the trench in any way, despite advice from his crew foreman that the
trench was unsafe. Defendant 's fai lure to take such safety precautions violated the
Occupational Health and Safety Act of North Carolina, and there was testimony o ffered
that failure to use a trench box and/or to reinforce the trench in that instance was virtually

10
21

329 N.C. 330, 340-/, 407 S. £. 2d 222. 227-8 (1 99 1).

Seymour v. Lenoir County, 567 S . E.2d 799, 80 1 , 1 52 N.C.App. 464, 464 (N. C.App. Aug 20, 2002)
8
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certain to result in the ditch collapsing. 22 The court ruled defendant's prior knowledge
and utter disregard of the dangers associ ated with trenching, his presence at the si te and
concomitant opportun ity to observe the hazards, his direction to decedent to proceed
with out the required safety precaut i ons, his d isregard for his foreman 's advice, and
scientific evidence support ing the testimony to that effect presented facts suffic ient to
survive defendant 's motion for summary j udgment.

23

Subseq uent North Caro lina decisions fol lowing Woodson further c l ari fi ed the
substantial certainty test, stating substantial certainty "is more than mere possibi l i ty or
substantial probabi l ity of serious inj ury or death, but is something less than actual
4

certainty. " 2 These decisions also illuminate the d i fficulty, analogous to the problem
faced by New Mexico courts in applying the Delgado except ion, in deciding how the
legal test in Wo odson should be applied to particular fact patterns. Judge Wynn astutely
expressed this concern in his concurrence to Pasrva v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. :
[S] ince creating the Woodson exception, t he Court has consi stently
pointed out facts that do not establ ish a Woodson claim. However, it
remains an u ncertainty as to what facts do allege a Woodson claim
su fficient to overcome pretrial dismi ssal. [ . . . ] [a] fter establ ishing the
' substantial certainty' stan d ard, the Woodson court did not further define
25
it, except as i t found the Woodson facts met it."
Prior to Pastva, the North Carolina Supreme Court d ism i ssed four cases for
having facts insu ffici ent to wi thstand pretrial dismissal under Woodson.

22

26

Pastva was

Woodson. 3 29 N.C. at 3 3 6.
Id. at 346.
Pasrva v. Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. , 1 2 1 N.C.App. 656, 659, 4 68 S . E . 2d 49 1 , 493 ( 1 996) .
25 Pasrva, 1 2 1 N.C. App. at 660- 1 , 4 68 S. E.2d at 495 (Judge Wynn, concurring)
26 Id
. at 660 (referring to Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc .. 333 N .C. 233, 4 24 S . E.2d 3 9 1 ( 1 993 ) ; Mickles v.
Duke Power Co. , 3 4 2 N.C. 1 03 , 463 S .E.2d 206 ( 1 995); Powell v. S& G Prestress Co. , 342 N.C. 1 82, 463
2..l
24

S . E . 2d 79 ( 1 99 5 ) ;

Echols v. Zarn, Inc. , 342 N.C. 1 84 , 4 63 S. E.2d 228 { 1 995)).

9
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dismissed by the trial court, but was reversed and remanded on appeal. 27 David Pastva
was emp loyed by Naege le Outdoor Advert ising, and was instructed to work on a
particu lar bi1lboard , whi ch subsequently collapsed and injw-ed Pastva. Tri al evidence
showed the collapse was caused by structural failure. Evidence further showed that: l )
the failure was caused by defendant ' s use of improper components and b y i mproperl y
mov ing the bi l lboard; 2) the defendant did not perform any inspections on the billboard ;
3) defendant provided plaintiff w ith no workp lace safety training; 4) defendant had actual
knowledge that the billboard was unsafe and dangerous immediately before it col lapsed ;
5) defendant had been cited and fined numerous times for workplace safety violations;
and 6) defendant acknowledged that the collapse would not have occurred but for the
defendant ' s "acts, conduct and omissi ons" with regard to the billboard. The court ruled
that these acts and omissions constituted intenti onal conduct which the defendants knew
or should have known was substantially certain to cause serious injury or death. 28
S everal more Woodson claims that succumbed to pre-trial defense motions in trial
courts were upheld on appeal before the North Carolina Court of Appeals met a set of
facts it felt met the narrowly de fined Woodson requirements. 29 In Whitaker v. Town of

Scotland Neck. Carlton Whitaker and two other maintenance workers were emptying a
dumpster. Whitaker ' s job was to attach the dumpster to the garbage truck 's lifting
equipment. After Whitaker attached the dwnpster and the l i ft was engaged, the latching
mechanism gave way and the dumpster swung free of its restraints, striking and pinning
21

Id. at 659.
Jd. at 657 .
29
Kelly v. Parkdale Mills, Jnc . . 1 2 1 N.C.App. 858, 468 S.E.2d 458 ( 1 996); Caple v. Bullard Restaurants.
Inc. , 567 S. E.2d 82'8, l 52 N.C.App. 42 1 (2002); Yancey v. lea, 5 50 S.E.2d 1 55, 354 N.C. 48 (200 1); Deem
v. Treadaway & Sons Painting & Wal/covering, Inc. , 543 S.E.2d 209, 142 N .C.App. 472 (200 1 ); Regan v.
Amerimark Bldg. Produces, Inc. , 127 N.C.App. 225, 489 S.E.2d 421 (1997).
28

10
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Whitaker against the truck. He died 28 days later. 30 An investigation by Scotland Neck 's
safety director revealed that the latching mechanism on the tru ck could not be latched by
hand and that the dumpster was bent. Several of Whitaker' s co-workers reported that the
latching mechanism and the dumpster had been broken for at least two months and that
1
the defects had been reported to their superv isor. 3 The supervisor denied any prior
2

knowledge of the defects. 3 An OSHA investigation ru led that the defective equipment
was the direct cause of the accident and that the accident was a result of employment
conditions not in compliance with OSHA safety standards, constituting five "seri ous"
violations of state labor law.

33

In its decision to reverse the trial court, the appeals court

adopted a six-factor test to determine when conduct is substantially certai n to result in
4

serious injury. 3 The makeup of the test soon became irrelevant, however, as the North
Carolina Supreme Court ovenuled Whitaker and held that the six - factor test for
substantial certainty "m isapprehends the narrowness o f the substantial certainty standard
set forth in [ Woodson ] . " 35
It should be noted that some j uri sdictions have declined to adopt North Carolina's
reasoning and have not followed Woodson, choosing to adopt even stricter st andards for
superceding workers compensation statute exclusivity provisions.

36

Whitaker

nevertheless rein forced the Woodson exception as providing only the narrowest
expansion of the exception to the exclusivity provisions of workers compensation
30
31

32

Whitaker, 1 54 N. C.App. 660, 572 S. E.2d 8 1 2 (2002).

/d at 66 I .

Id.
Id.
Id. at 663-64.
35 Wltitaker v. Scotland Neck, 2003 WL 2 25 1 8654 � 3 (N . C . )
36
Zimmerman v. Voldak Corp., 570 N.W.2d 204, 1 99 7 ND 203 (N.D . 1 997); Birklid v. Boeing Co., 904
P.2d 278, 1 27 Wasb .2d 8 53, 864 (Wash. 1 995) ; Peay v. U.S. Silica Co. , 437 S . E .2d 64 , 3 1 3 S .C. 9 1 ( S .C.
33
3
�

1 993).

11

A dvanced Tort Liti gation
Prof. Martinez, Spring 2004
rem ed ies for inj ured emp loyees. 37 Similarly, this appears to be the direction Delgado
jurisprudence in New Mexico is headed . Talcing into consideration the language
regarding the factual circumstances and employer conduct surround ing the deaths o f
plaintiffs in both Woodson an d Delgado, J S an d comparing the results with the balance o f
cases brought under them that d i d not survive pre�trial motions an d were affinned on
appeal, it is fair to make the correlation that, as wjth Woodson claims, egregiousness of
emp loyer conduct l eading to a determination of "constructive intent" on the part of an
employer, could at l east be an implied prerequisite for a finding o f material facts
su fficient to send a Delgado claim to a j ury. 39 Further support for trus comparison can be
drawn from both North Carolina ' s and New Mexico 's similar rejections of Pro fessor
Larso n ' s vigorous endorsement of the actual intent test 40 in Delgado4 1 and Woodson . 41
Whi l e North Carol ina jurisprudence stemming from Woodson is in no way
binding on New Mexico ' s treatment of Delgado claims, and nowhere in Delgado or its
progeny are Nonh Caro lina Woodson decisions referenced ; examinat ion o f the reasoning
behind Woodson and i t s progeny indi cates the direction of the path mapped out by
Delgado, Cordova and Wells : the Delgado exception to exclusivity of remedies under the

Workers Compensation Act w i l l be appl ied narrowly, and probab ly not at all in instances
which do not exhibit factual circumstances that might appear to meet the three-pronged
37 Whitaker, 11 3 .

ll

Compare the language in Whitaker. 2003 WL 225 1 8654 1 4 ( "The Woodson exception represeots a
narrow holding rn a fac t-specific case [ . . . ] Th.is exception applies onl y i n the most egregious cases of
employer misconduct. '') with rbat of Cordova, 2 73 F.Supp.2d at 1 2 1 9 ("[O)ne is easily repulsed by the
insens itivity of Phelps Dodge Supervisors to what had 10 be most certainly a disoscrous outcome for the
employee.").
39 Compare with the facts detailed in Exhibit A, infra.
40
6 Larson & Larson § 1 03 .03D
41
Delgado, 200 1 -NMSC-034 1 23, 1 3 1 N . M . at 278.
�

1

Woodson,

407 S.E. 2d at 230.

12
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Delgado test but do not reflect emp l oyer behavior that i s part icularly egregious, i .e . ,
conduct that clearly exhibits utter d i sregard fo r t h e safety of i t s employees .

V.

CONCLUSION
The decision i n Delgado, whi l e lega lly signi ficant, seems unl i kely to have a

measurable impact on the uni verse o f employee inj ury claims that might fall outside the
Workers ' Compensation Act. As J ustice Franchini stated in Delgado, "(W)e seriously
doubt that employers are will fu lly inj uring their emp loyees w ith such frequency that th e
consequence o f our deci sion to expose such employers to tort liability w ill be to 'wreak
3

havoc ' with the workers ' compensation system .'.4 Tru s statement, when taken into
considerat ion in conjunction with h is closing admonition , reproduced supra, indicates
that Just ice Franchini may have recognized the M acB ethian quality of his admonition:

Delgado is a landmark case, fi l led with sound and fury as a warni ng to wanton and
wi l l fully cal l ous emp l oyers. In i ts application, however, it thus far has signi fied nothing
for inst ances other than t hose exceptionally rare cases where an emp loyer does something
so construct i v e l y malevolent as to o ffend the sensib ilit ies o f the court.

44

u Delgado, 200 1 -NMSC-034 � 3 1 , 1 3 1 N . M . at 280.
� But see Exhibi t A, anacbed hereto. for an illustrat ion o f how the Delgado exception may not always be
as narrowly applied in trial couns as was envisioned by the New Mexico S upreme Coun.

13
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EXHIBIT A
Consi der the following scenario, based upon a suit fi l ed in New Mexico under the

Delgado exception. Names have been omitted to protect settlement confid ential ity, but
the facts o f the case are reflected accurately b ased on discovery and deposition testi mony:
A company involved in wastewater treatment deci des to change the chemicals it
uses to treat water. The new chemical and the old chemical are quite reactive and shou ld
never be mixed. The m anufacturer of the new chemical warns the company that the two
should not be mixed, and suggests the company buy a new storage tank to hold t he new
chemical. The company is under pressure to comp lete the changeover, and company
management has made representations to those with whom it has contracted that the new
chemical will be ready to be used on schedule. These representations are, however,
optimistic at best. The new tank has not been plumbed and is not ready to accept the new
chemical and, in fact, the new chemical has not been del ivered on the date expected . In
the meantime, a manager o f the company responsible for the proj ect, and the same man
who promised to the company ' s c l ients that the changeover wou ld be comp leted on time,
m akes the decision not to use a new tank, but instead to wash out the old tank. He
receives assurances from one o f the on-site employees that the tank i s being washed out
and will be ready when the new chemical arrives . The washing out p rocess involves
using a ru gh-pressure hose ins ide the tank to dilute and drain the old chemical .
The new chem ical is deli vered late on a Friday a fternoon, but the new tank is still
not ready. There is evidence that the employee misrepresented to the manager how far
along his crew was in washing out the tank . If the company refuses delivery, the driver
will take

rus payload back and the promi sed deadline will not be met. There are severa l
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employees on s i te waiting to accept delivery. Not knowing what to do, they cal l their
supervisor to the scene. The supervisor, who reports to the proj ect manager, arrives on
scene and sees that there is sti l l some of the o ld chemical in the bottom o f the tank, wruch
can't easi ly be drained because there is a l ip on the drain in the bottom of the tank. There
is con fl icting evidence as to whether the supervisor contacted the proj ect manager. The
proj ect manager later testifies that he was not consulted by the superv isor as to the
decisions then made on-site by the supervisor. The decisions turned out to have
devastating consequences , and the critical events unfolded as follows :
The supervisor took a hacksaw and attempted to cut down the lip of the drain
inside the tank. There were then more attempts to wash out the tank . The supervisor then
OK ' d the transfer of the new chemical. There was an initial trial run, whereby a sm al l
amount of th e chemical w as off-loaded into the tank, resulting i n the release o f a small
amount of white smoke from the tank. The employee who origina l ly called in his
superv i sor l ater (and was a p l aintiff in the lawsu it) testi fied that at this point he voiced hi s
concern about the safety of continuing with the o ffload. There is no corroborating
evidence to support his c l aims. There were then more attempts to wash out the tank,
fo l lowed by the supervisor ' s decision to go ahead with the full off-load. The off-load
began and the new chemical reacted with the remaining residue of the old chemi cal and
caused an explosion. Two emp loyees were seriously injured, including the
employee/p l aint i ff who cal led in the supervisor and allegedly voiced his sa fety concerns.
The supervisor was even more serious l y i nj ured, most of rus body covered in third-degree
chem ical bums. He died in the hospital the next day. Be fore dying, he said .,I [screwed]
up."
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The survivors brought a wrongful death action under Delgado against the
company, al leging that the actions of the company, by and through the now deceased
m anager, met the three-pronged test for willful conduct and substantial certainty set forth
by the Delgado court and, therefore, entitled plaintiffs' to seek their remedies in tort
rather than under the Workers Compensation Act.
Defens e attorneys argued in a motion for summary j udgment that as a matter of
law the Delgado requirements had not been met, to wit that no jury cou ld reasonably find
that ei ther the supervisor or company management was substantiall y certain that serious
inj ury or death would occur and wi l l fu l ly proceeded to order the off-load in spite of this
certainty, when the person whom the plainti ff alleges acted willfully and in utter
disregard for the consequences was the supervisor who died as a result of the explosion .

1t was, the defense argued , at worst gross negligence. The Court ruled agai nst the motion,
finding the fact s suffici ent to bring before a j u ry and sched uled the case for trial. It never
got there, however, as a sett lement was reached the day before the trial was scheduled to
begin .
Both sides acknowledged privately that had the case gone to trial and resulted in a
verdict for plaintiffs, the trial j udge 's decision to allow the case to be heard under

Delgado would have been a contentious issue on appeal. Of course, both sides expressed
con fidence that they wou ld have emerged victorious . . .

45

H The contents of Exhibit A may not be reproduced in any form, as they represent the facts underlying a
confidential settlement. They arc reproduced here for academic purposes only.
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